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Having attracted attention with a somewhat futuristic title, I wish 
to assure you that China is not about to become a IIpowerli in the Pacific 
islands region in the terms we usually think of. While her naval forces 
are expanding, they will not pose a challenge to the United States or in-
creasing Soviet presence in the area. Nor would China really be in a posi-
tion to out-do the Japanese should that nation, as is likely, redevelop as 
a seapower. What is more, for a host of geopolitical reasons, China will 
take a stance in her home waters and the Northwest Pacific long before she 
ventures into the South Pacific region which concerns the majority of us at 
this conference. And when she does so, her most concentrated efforts will 
be reserved for the waters adjacent to the South China Sea. Likewise, what-
ever technology Peking develops to exploit marine resources will be applied 
first to her own continental shelf and not to the ocean depths. Nevertheless, 
as if to emulate some old Taoist maxim, China's very lack of conventional 
strength is apt to prove of considerable leverage in the newly independent 
Pacific. At any rate, it is this theme that I wish to comment upon today. 
On her terms, China will be a factor in the region. 
In a recently featured editorial, People's Daily--the official organ of 
the party and government--affirmed China's determination to playa part in 
the South Pacific. 1 As might be expected, Peking portrayed the region as one 
59 
60 
torn by Great Power struggle and particularly vulnerable to Soviet expansion 
and intrigue. But the author, in line with major changes in Chinese foreign 
policy since the Cultural Revolution, stressed China's commitment to support 
all Third World countries regardless of their social or political system. 
In an effort to combat Soviet--and American--expansion, Peking further urged 
regional cooperation and encouraged Australia and New Zealand to pursue an 
active role in the region. 
China's interest in the Pacific has, of course, grown up almost overnight 
together with the mushrooming new nations. In most cases, this may prove an 
advantage for Peking which seeks to play up her own semi-colonial past. More-
over, by supporting economic cooperation, cultural exchange and the exclusive 
economic zone concept, China has rapidly gained friends. But, it is her 
pledge to resist Great Power hegemonism which seems to have struck the most 
responsive chord. Before belaboring the obvious to tell you of the appeals 
and also the dangers of any Big Brother approach to peoples so long ensnared 
in dependency relationships, let me sketch the short history of China's rela-
tions in the area. 
The first hint of interest came in the fall of 1970 when Zhou Enlai 
offered his best wishes to a Fiji which had been promised independence. 2 Within 
two years, China had commenced diplomatic relations with Australia and New 
Zealand, entered the ping-pong era, and grown even more suspicious of Russian 
intentions. 3 By the closing months of 1975, a South Pacific strategy was al-
most fully developed. In September, Zhou announced China's intention to rec-
ognize Papua New Guinea and established actual relations with Fiji and Western 
Samoa in November. In each instance, Peking pledged to respect the sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity of the new nations while introducing what may 
well prove to be the most critical themes: along with their peoples, the 
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Chinese belong to the Third World and must, inevitably, share in the struggle 
against imperialism. 4 The strange yet important twist, however, was that 
the Fiji accord was signed in Canberra. But the logic of acknowledging Aus-
tralia's natural role in the region was made clear the following spring when 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser visited an aging Mao and later, heard Hua Guo-
feng describe China's growing fear of "the other superpower" and its Ilexpan-
sionist ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region." As Hua continued, "We are 
both concerned for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and opposed to 
the seeking of hegemony by any country or group of countries."S 
This strategy of supporting the regional powers as a means of thwarting 
greater opponents applied also to New Zealand. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
had, in fact, preceded Fraser in visiting Peking. 6 When the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives paid a call nine months later, the line had hardened: 
"Situated in the Asia-Pacific region, China and New Zealand are both naturally 
concerned That very superpower is stepping up its infiltration and ex-
pansion in this region. We are very glad to see that the government of Ne\'1 
Zealand and some other Oceanic countries are sharpening their vigilance against 
the superpower's expansionist ambition ... '.7 In the fall of 1977, when Brian 
Edward Talboys who was carrying several portfolios for Wellington arrived in 
China, the United States had returned to the picture of a Pacific caught be-
tween two contending global powers but, once again, the "social imperialists" 
received top billing. And the New Zealander could not miss the message that 
his country was expected to lead the movement against outside intervention. S 
For those who have followed Chinese foreign policy, Peking's dependency 
on the resolve of Australia and New Zealand, countries which have strong ties 
to Western Europe and America, is a dramatic shift of position but, as is 
usually the case, a change demanded by strategic considerations and explained 
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to the point of rationalization by the words of Mao. It was, therefore, 
understandable that the publicity surrounding Chairman Hill of the Australian 
Communist Party differed in content if not intent from that of his country's 
formal government when he turned up in Peking at the start of 1978. According 
to the Australian Communist organ, Vanguard, Chairman Mao's theory of the 
differentiation of the three worlds has now come to affect the course of revo-
lution in Oceania: second world countries such as those ruled from Canberra 
and Wellington can be counted on to unite with smaller nations on certain 
issues and, most critically, share in the struggle to redesign the international 
d t 1 d d . t' 9 or er 0 prec u e superpower omlna lon. 
Part of the third world by self-definition, China has been on the lookout 
for common interests and issues. 10 In the South Pacific area, the most obvious 
of these concern the sea. Throughout the various sessions of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea which commenced in June 1974, China has con-
sistently supported the position of South Seas states. What has been at stake, 
according to Peking, has been nothing less than "a struggle to defend maritime 
sovereignty.l,l1 For her part, China has stood up for the 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone, also pushed by the South Pacific Forum, and held out 
for full international control over the extraction of deep seabed resources. 12 
The goal, expressed in a recent issue of Beijing Review, while giving congrat-
ulations to the Gilbert Island Group upon its independence, is "all 6 million 
square miles of South Pacific waters under jurisdiction of relevant sovereign 
South Pacific States.,,13 Of course, with her own continental shelf to protect 
and disputed islands in both the East and South China Seas, the Middle Kingdom 
is concerned with more than either idealism or propaganda. 14 Nevertheless, 
China's own interests in keeping the rich and technologically advanced nations 
from exploiting ocean resources genuinely correspond with those of a region 
now riding a high tide of nationalism and can be used to foreign policy 
advantage. 
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Back in the 1950s and early 60s, other Third World countries were courted 
(and occasionally undermined) in an attempt to combat American encirclement. 
The principles of Peaceful Coexistence enunciated at Bandung in 1955 did make 
some friends in Asia, but courtship of formerly colonized nations took a back 
seat to the smoking rhetoric of paradoxically isolationist leaders during the 
Cultural Revolution. Once the Russians emerged as more than a sparring part-
ner in ideological dispute, and with U.S. rapprochement leading to United Na-
tions respectability, the early hints at a more positive form of world leader-
ship took root. Today, having dropped talk of the II rura1 areas ll spreading 
revolution to a North America and Western Europe prosaically described as 
IIcities of the wor1d,1I Peking has worked to create another United Front. 
This time, the principal enemy is the Soviet Union. 
According to one editorialist: liThe Developing Countries of the South 
Pacific region have strengthened their unity with second world countries in 
the struggle against hegemonism. 1I15 In the final analysis, however, the 
ability of all the nations in the area to resist plundering by outsiders 
depends on the viability of their own regional economy. For this reason, 
China has attached great importance to the South Pacific Forum and the 10ng-
term goal of some sort of Pacific Common Market. As a visiting delegation 
from Western Samoa learned in Peking in March 1977, China also offers the 
lure of economic cooperation. 16 New Zealand and Australia have already shown 
promise of becoming major trading partners with China,17 but Peking seeks 
commercial ties with far less lucrative markets. Indeed, the plan of attack 
sketched by the Chinese delegation before the U.N. Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific at its summer 1978, New Delhi meetings stressed trade 
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and the unity thus forged as critical factors in deterring further Great Power 
penetration. 18 Meanwhile, back in Oceania, the Chinese put theory into prac-
tice with the opening of a trade fair at Suva, Fiji. 19 
Clearly, Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Marais Fiji is a special case, 
or rather, the model for the relationships China hopes to establish throughout 
the area. Embassies have been opened, athletic teams have exchanged visits, 
and economic cooperation has been stressed. 20 A Peoplels Daily editorial 
welcoming diplomatic ties in the fall of 1975 pulled together the whole bag 
of foreign policy themes: 
We have always maintained that all countries big 
or small should be equal ... Both China and Fiji 
belong to the Third World. Our two peoples have 
suffered from imperialist aggression and oppres-
sion and have always supported and sympathized 
with each other in the struggle against colonialism 
and imperialism ... We firmly oppose hegemonism 
and power politics pursued by the imperialists, 
the superpowers in particular. 21 
A real clue to the strength of the relationship came later, in early summer 
1978, when Mara appeared in Peking for talks with Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier 
Li Xiannian. 22 But the most gratifying news did not become public until after 
the prime minister returned to Fiji where he announced that his government in-
tended to reject Soviet efforts to set up an embassy. Mentioning his recent 
trip to China, Mara was reported to have said that the Chinese were sincere and 
aboveboard while the Russians had only subversion in mind. 23 By the end of 
June, Fiji legislators concurred by an overwhelming majority which prompted a 
Chinese commentator to note that "Fiji does not want to become another Cuba." 24 
China was similarly pleased when Tonga, together with Fiji, turned down 
the Soviet vice minister and commercial attache who toured the South Pacific 
in 1975 offering aid in an attempt to establish fishing bases. 25 And Beijing 
Review provided coverage of an incident that Papua New Guinea would probably 
just as soon forget: the reported landing of "later-day tsarists" on an 
uninhabited island claimed by Somare's state. 26 
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Although Peking would like to build a Fiji-type relationship with Papua 
New Guinea, there are a number of considerations which have complicated the 
balance of power game. Indeed, the government in Port Moresby, responding 
to domestic criticism and always reluctant to give anti-communist Indonesia 
anything to become agitated about, has not yet given permission to either 
the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China to open embassies. Close 
to a decision in the spring of 1978, the whole matter has been deferred for 
at least a year. 27 It is not that Prime Minister Michael Somare has never 
played the China card. Fortuitously, the first foreign dignitary to arrive 
in China after the death of Mao, he was met at the airport by Hua Guofeng, 
flown to Hong Kong on a special Chinese jet, and apparently basked in the 
publicity given his infant nation by a Peking which emphasized its own affin-
ities with the Third World. 28 There has also been some exchange of cultural 
groups,29 and a steady, if small, parade of lesser governmental functionaries 
to rural China to observe the ways in which intermediate technology might be 
applied to agriculture in Papua New Guinea. What is more, the China trade is 
clearly on an upswing with Peking providing inexpensive consumer goods in ex-
change for copper, timber and cocoa. As one scholar of the area has noted, 
a China connection does offer Somare an opportunity to reduce his dependence 
on Australia and, despite some dangers, will undoubtedly experience controlled 
growth. 30 
Elsewhere in the region, China remains eager for new friendships. In 
the summer of 1977, a Chinese acrobatic troupe touring Western Samoa drew 
80,000 spectators during its stay.31 Even tiny Nauru's picture appeared in 
People's Daily32 and, when newly independent, the Solomon Islands were the 
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subject of a series of special articles. 33 Just last November, the Gilbert 
Islands had their turn. 34 In all these cases, the Peking press--so often 
the wellspring of diatribe in the past--was entirely objective even when it 
came to making reference to the colonial heritages. The virulent words are 
found elsewhere; these are directed not backward to the years before independ-
ence but toward lithe late-coming superpower II who, ~Jith fitting marine meta-
phor, "wild with ambition is stretching tentacles everywhere in the world. II 
According to these charges, the Soviet Union is using "every means to infil-
trate this region under the signboards Ichampion of national liberation l and 
Ifriendly cooperation. 11135 As a new and dangerous menace, this particular 
hegemonist must be excluded from the Pacific. 
Although there are some who think that the Chinese are secretly eager for 
American bases to remain in the Pacific,36 and this is probably true for colder 
waters, the use of one great power to check another will not sit well with the 
emerging nations to the South. At this stage, Peking does not seek a balance 
of power per se, but rather the restriction of Russian influence and maritime 
expansion. As long as American interests coincide, China will not press for 
U.S. ouster from either Micronesia or Samoa. The justification, as one Chi-
nese editorialist tiptoed across a sensitive issue: the Americans are really 
only protecting their vested interests; the expanding Soviets pose a different 
kind of threat. While the South Pacific region does constitute a "new area 
of contention for hegemony between the Soviet. Union and the United States," 
the present strategy calls for reliance on second world countries and unity 
amongst the islanders .. Ironically, China even has kind words for Japanese 
and West German aid which it believes has lito a certain extent contained the 
infiltration of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific." 37 Thus, all of the 
former colonial masters have a role to play. 
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It is certainly no coincidence that the Shanghai Communique between the 
u.S. and China was the first bilateral statement to contain an anti-hegemony 
clause: "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is 
opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish 
hegemony." Since then, the Chinese have attempted to get as many nations as 
possible to add their names to the list so transparently designed to discourage 
S . t . 38 OVle expanSlon. 
The warming of Sino-American relations has continued to carry the headlines. 
In December, the Australian prime minister and the general secretary of the 
French Communist Party, ordinarily strange bedfellows, found themselves quoted 
in the pages of People's Daily as supporters of U.S.-China friendship. While 
the first expectedly praised rapprochement as a step toward peace and prosper-
ity, the second suggested that closer relations with the Americans provided 
additional means to combat "any hegemonist movement in the Asia-Pacific 
region.,,39 Thus, while the United States as a superpower receives mixed 
reviews, Chinese leaders recognize the value of a powerful ally. It now 
seems strange to read the word "containment" in the Chinese Communist press, 
but the time-worn cliche is finding new spokesmen in Peking. 
As a consequence, China has been paying particularly close attention to 
the arms race and the relative strength of the competing superpowers. She 
is visibly alarmed over Soviet naval superiority and expansion into the In-
dian Ocean and the Northwestern Pacific. 40 Ironically, Peking has also noted 
that the U.S. 7th Fleet is no match for the Russians,41 and has quoted no 
1 ess an anti -communi st source than U. S. News and Worl d Report when stati sti cs 
published therein confirmed fears. 42 Balance of power is always a tricky 
business. Obviously, American strength is in China's interests insomuch as 
it restrains another more dangerous foe. Peking's long-term security can, 
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however, be obtained only through military modernization and, quite possibly, 
the eventual extension of her own power overseas. While this speaker believes 
that China's present effort to help Pacific nations resist exploitation is 
genuine, it is not improper to speculate about a time when China mcy have the 
technological and military wherewithall to stake her own claims in the South 
Pacific. 
There is no question that China, like Japan, is a potential giant in the 
area. At present the Chinese navy is large but almost exclusively defensive 
with little ability to project itself far from shore. 43 Although there are 
some who believe that China's 60 or more submarines (one or two are nuclear) 
could be used effectively in the insular Pacific, at least as a foreign policy 
statement,44 the present international situation will keep these vessels close 
to home in the defensive front lines. Most experts agree, however, that China 
has not been utilizing her full shipbuilding capacity. As we move into the 
1980s, she will be producing still more attack submarines and adding surface-
to-surface missle equipped combat ships which, if constructed to the standards 
of existing prototypes, will be very much up to date. 45 
The country's merchant marine is likewise expanding. When one counts the 
surprising number of ships registered under flags of convenience, China's fleet 
is second only to that of Japan in Asia and ranks 15th in global comparisons. 
By buying ships abroad (either new or mothballed in the case of much needed 
tankers), the Chinese can be expected to carry an even greater percentage of 
their Asian and Pacific trade in ships showing the Chinese flag. 46 Moreover, 
China's own shipbuilding industry has been producing dozens of seafaring trans-
ports in the 10,000 ton range since 1960 with ships four and five times that 
size beginning to be commissioned. 47 
Growth in all these programs may have some spin-off effect in the South 
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Pacific when, having upgraded her fleets, China may wish to sell or lease 
smaller coastal vessels suitable for inter-island work. Even more likely, 
Peking may provide fast, modern, patrol boats to friendly states as a token 
gesture in defense of their independence and against Soviet advances. 
Another area of likely Chinese activity is oceanographic technology. 
As she becomes more sophisticated at home, China will be capable of giving 
modest assistance. Ships with geological and scientific missions have 
already spent many days exploring the South China Sea and resource-rich 
northern waters, and on at least one occasion, two research vessels made a 
seventy-two day cruise crisscrossing the Pacific. 48 Nevertheless, as was 
the case with her sumbarines, it will be a full decade before Peking can 
divert equipment from areas close to home. The one exception to watch will 
be when China perfects a true ICBM and must test it over ocean swells. Then, 
as a perceptive scholar of the legal issues has already noted, it will be 
interesting to see the reaction in South Pacific capitals. 49 
China's most immediate concerns, would, however, appear to be in the 
South China Sea. The Spratly and Paracel Islands which were targets of 
gunboat diplomacy back in 1974, are currently of far greater geopolitical 
importance. Off the coast of rival Vietnam and astride major seaplanes, 
these dots of sand are crucial outposts from which China can observe Russian 
movements, explore for oil, base fishing ships and look beyond to more dis-
tant waters. 50 Within range of Hainan island's fighter squadrons, the 
islands--if they can be held--will enable the Chinese to draw a defense net 
at least partway to the Philippines. In order to consolidate claims, Peking 
has announced irregular ferry service from Hainan to the Paracels,51 and more 
activity should be anticipated. Rumors that the Chinese have finally started 
to construct landing craft fits this as well as the familiar Taiwan situation. 52 
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In any case, as events begin to enfold regarding all of the offshore islands, 
we will learn a little more about China's capabilities at sea. 
For the present, South Pacific nations have little to fear from the 
People's Republic and can expect Chinese support in international forums. 
They might, perhaps, keep another ancient Taoist saying in mind: "When a 
greater nation is humble before a lesser nation, it prevails over the lesser 
nation. II But, then, American policy makers might heed the same advice. 
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